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Abstract
Estimates of the burden of disease assess the mortality and morbidity that affect a population by 
producing summary measures of health such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). These measures typically do not include stillbirths (fetal 
deaths occurring during the later stages of pregnancy or during labor) among the negative health 
outcomes they count. Priority setting decisions that rely on these measures are therefore likely to 
place little value on preventing the more than three million stillbirths that occur annually 
worldwide. In contrast, neonatal deaths, which occur in comparable numbers, have a substantial 
impact on burden of disease estimates and are commonly seen as a pressing health concern. In this 
paper we argue in favor of incorporating unintended fetal deaths that occur late in pregnancy into 
estimates of the burden of disease. Our argument is based on the similarity between late-term 
fetuses and newborn infants and the assumption that protecting newborns is important. We 
respond to four objections to counting stillbirths: (1) that fetuses are not yet part of the population 
and so their deaths should not be included in measures of population health; (2) that valuing the 
prevention of stillbirths will undermine women’s reproductive rights; (3) that including stillbirths 
implies that miscarriages (fetal deaths early in pregnancy) should also be included; and (4) that 
birth itself is in fact ethically significant. We conclude that our proposal is ethically preferable to 
current practice and, if adopted, is likely to lead to improved decisions about health spending.
Estimates of the burden of disease, such as the Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD),1 
attempt to assess the impact of mortality and morbidity as a result of disease by producing 
summary measures of population health that allow for comparisons between diseases and 
between regions. For instance, the GBD uses the disability-adjusted life year (DALY), 
which represents health lost to both death and disability using a common unit. Roughly 
speaking, one DALY represents the loss of one year of healthy life. While DALYs purport 
simply to represent health lost, they are also designed to be used for priority setting in the 
allocation of funds for research, treatment, and prevention, and have in fact been used for 
this purpose.2 The fact that two diseases differ in the number of DALYs they create may be 
taken as a basis for prioritizing research into the disease that is associated with more; the 
fact that one health intervention averts more DALYs for the same cost than another may be 
used to justify prioritizing the first over the second within a public health care system.
As DALYs were originally designed, and as they are currently implemented, they take into 
account the impact of disease on individuals starting at birth, but not on unborn fetuses. The 
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same is true of other common summary measures of health, such as quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs). When a disease kills an infant, that event is associated with a large number 
of DALYs, since the infant thereby loses many years of life. However, while maternal 
conditions that result in the unwanted loss of a pregnancy may be taken into account insofar 
as they affect the health of the mother, the impact of the death on the fetus itself is not, even 
if it dies during labor. As a result, the loss of the healthy years that the resulting child might 
have been expected to live does not contribute any DALYs. Policy-makers who use 
summary measures of health, such as DALYs, in decisions about how to spend money on 
health care and research, are therefore likely to give substantially lower priority to 
interventions that prevent stillbirths than they would if preventing a stillbirth were 
considered equivalent to saving an infant’s life. Fetal deaths, including stillbirths, are not 
included in the Global Burden of Disease Study and they are not mentioned in the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals.3
The omission of stillbirths is not the result of technical limitations of health measures. They 
could be modified to include the impact of events prior to birth. For instance, Jamison et al. 
describe a model on which fetuses begin to ‘count’ for purposes of DALY calculations from 
13 weeks prior to birth.4 Nor is the omission (entirely) the result of a lack of data. It is true 
that collection of data on fetal deaths, particularly outside of high-income countries, is 
currently limited, and neither the total number of such deaths nor their causes can be 
determined with certainty.5 These limitations would complicate the calculation of DALYs if 
prenatal deaths were included. However, estimates of disease prevalence and burden already 
include numerous diseases for which data are imperfect or incomplete; such challenges are 
not reasons to ignore outcomes that otherwise should be included. Moreover, sufficient 
information is available regarding the prevalence of prenatal death to at least provide an 
indication of its bearing on the burden of disease. WHO estimates suggest that, of the 
approximately 56.6 million total deaths in 2001, 7.7 million occurred between birth and one 
year of age.6 By comparison, in 2000 an estimated 3.2 million stillbirths went uncounted.7
Including stillbirths in summary measures of health is possible, and likely to have a 
significant impact on priority setting. But should it be done? Summary measures of health 
by their nature simplify information about health, trading richness of detail for simplicity 
and ease of use. In doing so, however, they must avoid presenting information in a manner 
that is likely to lead policymakers to make worse decisions. In this paper we aim to defend a 
proposal that will meet the needs of policymakers, while representing an improvement over 
current practice from an ethical perspective. We argue that fetal deaths occurring after 28 
weeks gestational age that are not the result of voluntary abortions should be taken into 
account in summary measures of health, and we present a proposal for doing so that we 
think should command widespread support. We refer to such fetal deaths as ‘stillbirths,’ 
consistent with the definition used by the World Health Organization (WHO).8
We begin by describing several interventions whose relative effectiveness would be very 
different if the prevention of stillbirths was counted as a health gain. This shows that the 
question of whether stillbirths should be included matters for priority setting decisions. We 
then present a simple argument in favor of the inclusion of stillbirths. Having thereby 
provided a prima facie justification for including stillbirths, we consider several arguments 
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against including stillbirths for reasons of policy or principle, and show that none is 
compelling. However, these arguments do suggest that prenatal deaths should not be 
counted in exactly the same way as other deaths. We close with a conservative proposal for 
how the burden of disease due to stillbirths could be included in measures of population 
health. According to our proposal some loss of valuable life is associated with stillbirths 
after 28 weeks of fetal age and the magnitude of the loss increases gradually from this point 
as the fetus develops. Our discussion throughout the paper and our proposal are couched in 
the language of DALYs. However, our conclusions apply equally to any summary measure 
of health used for setting priorities for spending on health.
1. Stillbirths and the burden of disease
The inclusion of stillbirths in summary measures of health has the potential to substantially 
impact two types of decisions about allocating resources for health. First, if averting a 
stillbirth is considered a health gain then this provides a reason for funding research and the 
provision of interventions that only, or primarily, avert stillbirths. Second, many of the 
interventions known to reduce the occurrence of stillbirths also improve maternal health, for 
instance by curing infection or improving nutrition. Including stillbirths will increase the 
measured impact of interventions that improve the health of both the mother and the fetus, 
and can thereby justify increased priority for funding such interventions over alternatives.
Major risk factors associated with stillbirth include childbirth complications, maternal 
infections in pregnancy, maternal disorders (especially hypertension and diabetes), fetal 
growth restriction, and congenital abnormalities.9 Approximately 99% of stillbirths occur in 
low- and middle-income countries; the existence of such disparities between regions 
suggests that many stillbirths are preventable.10
The following two examples illustrate the potential that including stillbirth prevention as a 
health benefit to the fetus has for changing health priorities.
Undernutrition is a major factor contributing to the burden of disease in low- and middle-
income countries; for example, childhood underweight is the leading risk factor for DALYs 
in most of Africa.11 Maternal malnutrition, both during pregnancy and earlier in life, is also 
a risk factor for stillbirths and for low birth weight, which in turn can lead to death or 
disability for the infant. A recent review suggests that balanced protein-energy 
supplementation for pregnant women across a number of populations at risk for maternal 
malnutrition reduces the risk of low birth weight by approximately 32%, and of stillbirth by 
38%, with even greater effects among malnourished women.12 Thus, even without counting 
stillbirths, this intervention has the potential to avert DALYs associated both with maternal 
health, and with the effects of low birth weight on live-born infants. This finding suggests 
that, if such supplementation is sufficiently cost-effective, there is some reason to fund it 
even if stillbirths are not considered. However, if a stillbirth were associated with a similar 
number of DALYs to that currently associated with an infant death, the inclusion of 
stillbirths in DALY calculations could plausibly double the number of DALYs preventable 
through this intervention, and consequently reduce the cost per DALY prevented by half.13
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An even more dramatic example is given by a study of the cost-effectiveness of an antenatal 
syphilis screening program in Mwanza city, Tanzania between 1997 and 1999.14 The 
program incorporated rapid syphilis screening and treatment with benzathene penicillin into 
routine antenatal care for pregnant women in Mwanza. Women with untreated high titre 
active syphilis were estimated to be nineteen times more likely to have a stillbirth and three 
times more likely to give birth to a low birth weight infant than uninfected women.15 
According to the authors’ calculations, the cost per stillbirth averted was $318.37 and the 
cost per low birth weight infant averted was $451.18.16 This translated into $92.56 per 
DALY saved if only the prevention of low birth weight was included in the calculations and 
$8.88 per DALY if the prevention of stillbirths was included.17 The inclusion of stillbirths 
therefore made a tenfold difference in the apparent cost-effectiveness of the program as 
measured by dollars per DALY saved. In a population with high levels of untreated syphilis, 
like the one in Mwanza, this is sufficient to change the program from being substantially 
less cost-effective than current high-priority interventions such as neviripine for prevention 
of mother to child transmission of HIV, oral rehydration therapy, or childhood 
immunizations, to being very competitive with those interventions.
The cost-effectiveness comparisons provided in the above examples assume that all 
stillbirths are associated with the same number of DALYs as an infant death. Later in this 
paper, we present a proposal for counting stillbirths that weights them less heavily. The 
examples illustrate the potential impact of choices about how stillbirths are counted, not 
positive proposals for exactly how to count them.
2. An argument for including stillbirths in estimates of disease
We have argued that including stillbirths in calculations of the burden of disease has the 
potential to make a substantial difference to how priorities are set for certain decisions about 
healthcare and research. Should stillbirths be included? Here we present a simple argument 
in favor of including them, based on the counterintuitive consequences of failing to do so at 
the individual and population level.
Currently, summary measures of health include the effects of disease on very young infants, 
including those who die nearly immediately after birth, but do not include the effects of 
disease on fetuses that die before or during labor. This difference has counter-intuitive 
consequences. Imagine two identical fetuses 36 weeks after fertilization. If one dies during 
labor, its death is considered irrelevant to the burden of disease. If the other is born alive but 
then dies five minutes later as a result of injuries incurred during labor, its death is counted 
as resulting in 86 DALYs—the maximum number that can be associated with any health 
outcome. In this example, both the two fetuses themselves and the manners of their deaths 
are very similar. It is difficult to point to any fact about them or how they die that justifies 
taking one into account but not the other.18 Yet such a fact must be identified if the 
exclusion of stillbirths is to be justified, either from an ethical perspective or from within the 
internal logic of the summary measure of health being used. One of the four general 
principles described as underlying DALYs is “treating like outcomes as like.”19 The two 
deaths described here are apparently like outcomes. Unless birth itself is shown to make 
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infant deaths very different from late stillbirths, it is implausible that they should be treated 
so differently.
Further counter-intuitive implications follow if measures that do not account for stillbirths 
are used for priority setting. In a society where a large number of infants die shortly after 
birth, current practice would describe these deaths as constituting a large burden of disease. 
However, if this society responded by reducing its prenatal care, in such a way that most 
pregnancies that once would have resulted in neonatal deaths instead resulted in stillbirths 
late in pregnancy, the number of DALYs associated with these pregnancies would drop 
sharply. In fact, the health of the mother aside, a pregnancy resulting in a stillbirth is 
associated with the same number of DALYs (zero) as a pregnancy resulting in the birth of 
an infant that goes on to live a full, healthy life. Thus relying on DALYs as currently 
calculated might make it appear that this society has effectively ‘solved’ its infant death 
problem. Yet it is highly implausible to think that a population in which many fetuses die 
late in pregnancy is just as healthy as one in which those same fetuses survive and lead 
healthy lives until death in old age.20
Failing to count stillbirths as a loss of healthy life, then, has counter-intuitive consequences 
both in individual cases and for priority setting. The similarities between a fetus shortly 
before birth and an infant shortly after birth justify a presumption in favor of treating them 
similarly. Since we assume that counting infant deaths is appropriate, treating these 
outcomes similarly implies counting at least stillbirths late in pregnancy as well. Unless 
there is some positive reason to exclude these stillbirths, we ought to include them. We now 
consider possible arguments for excluding stillbirths and argue that all of them fail.
3. Arguments for excluding stillbirths from measures of disease burden
The ethics and health economics literature suggests four distinct possible arguments against 
the inclusion of stillbirths in summary measures of health: (1) That such estimates are only 
intended to measure the health of currently living populations; (2) That arguments in favor 
of including stillbirths implausibly imply that one should count miscarriages early in 
pregnancy on a par with infant deaths; (3) That including any fetal deaths, such as stillbirths, 
would undermine the right of women to choose abortion; and (4) That birth is itself ethically 
significant in a way that justifies excluding stillbirths from measures of the burden of 
disease. We respond to these objections in turn.
3.1. First objection: Fetuses are not members of the population
DALYs are commonly described as a summary measure of population health; that is, they 
provide a tool to “represent the health of a particular population in a single number.”21 It 
might be argued that an unborn fetus has not yet become part of the population that DALYs 
are intended to describe. The fact that DALYs do not include stillbirths would not then 
suggest that these deaths do not matter, but only that they fall outside the purview of the 
measure.
If DALYs were used purely as a descriptive statistic, then such an objection might be 
reasonable, provided that the restricted scope of the measure was made clear. DALYs 
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including stillbirths and DALYs excluding them would both be valid measures of different 
things, and versions of DALYs that claimed only to describe the health of people who had 
already been born could not be faulted for doing exactly that.
However, if DALYs are to be used as a tool for priority setting, then they should take into 
account those factors that are relevant to priority setting. Murray argues that the important 
objectives of DALYs include aiding in priority setting for treatment and research, and that 
“any health outcome that affects social welfare should in some way be reflected in the 
indicator of the burden of disease.”22 To the extent that the harm caused by stillbirths is 
relevant to decisions about how to care for a population, a statistic that fails to account for 
this harm is not suitable for use in making priority setting decisions. Thus it is not enough to 
say that versions of DALYs that exclude stillbirths would be an accurate measure of 
something. DALYs, as used for priority setting, should include them if they are relevant to 
priority setting. We presume that the death of a fetus whose well-being is similarly 
important to that of an infant should be taken into account in priority setting; thus, stillbirths 
should be included in DALYs unless it can be shown that the well-being of even a fully 
developed fetus is not similarly important to that of an infant.
3.2. Second Objection: Including stillbirths requires including miscarriages
If stillbirths are considered in assessing the burden of disease, on the basis that harms to 
fetuses are ethically significant, then the same reasoning might seem to extend to 
miscarriages (deaths prior to 28 weeks gestational age). Given that the number of DALYs 
resulting from a death depends in part on the number of years of life lost, a miscarriage 
would then result in as many or more DALYs as a stillbirth or infant death. Intuitively, 
however, preventing the death of infants is significantly more important than preventing a 
comparable number of miscarriages. One might think that current approaches, which 
prioritize the prevention of miscarriages only to the extent that they harm pregnant women 
(but not their fetuses), more accurately capture our judgments of the relative importance of 
miscarriages and infant deaths. Thus one might object to including any fetal deaths in 
summary measures of health, in order to avoid giving excess weight to miscarriages in 
priority setting.
Including stillbirths in measures of the burden of disease, however, does not imply that the 
deaths of all fetuses and embryos must be considered as equally important. We have argued 
that fetal deaths late in pregnancy should not be excluded entirely. How to treat miscarriages 
is a further question: even if late stillbirths were treated similarly to infant deaths, 
miscarriages could still be associated with fewer or no DALYs. This increase in DALYs 
over time would make sense if early-stage fetuses and embryos are harmed less by death 
than infants are, or if for some other reason it were less important to prevent harms to them. 
If we wish to avoid giving the same priority to preventing miscarriages as preventing infant 
deaths, refusing to count any fetal deaths to any extent is neither the only nor the most 
plausible way of doing so. We sketch a specific proposal in Section 5, according to which 
the harm to the fetus from dying should start to count from the onset of sentience. Fetal 
deaths before this point should not be counted because the fetus does not have the minimum 
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characteristics needed for harms to them to matter morally. This proposal takes into account 
the idea that the capacities that matter develop gradually.
3.3. Third Objection: Including stillbirths requires including abortions
Including stillbirths in the burden of disease as negative health outcomes suggests that the 
death of a fetus is ethically significant, that is, an event that we have ethical reasons to be 
concerned about, and therefore reasons to try to prevent. One might object that, if it is 
ethically important to prevent the death of fetuses, then this provides grounds for preventing 
women from making the choice to terminate their own pregnancies, and thus impinges on an 
important right.
However, it does not follow that since the unintended death of at least some fetuses is 
ethically significant, women should be denied the right to have an abortion. First, it might be 
true both that a fetus is harmed by death, and that causing that death is permissible. The 
permissibility of causing death is a distinct ethical question that must take into account other 
considerations such as, at least, a woman’s rights to control over her body.23 Second, even if 
causing the death of a fetus shortly before birth were ethically impermissible, it might still 
be the case that abortions earlier in pregnancy, when the vast majority in fact occur, are 
permissible. The argument presented in Section 2 suggested only that stillbirths late in 
pregnancy should be included in summary measures of health, not that all fetal deaths 
should be. It is plausible, for reasons that we elaborate below, that there may be a period 
following fertilization when a fetal death does not harm the fetus and so is not ethically 
significant in the way that a stillbirth or infant death is.
Still, if it is true that if a fetus may be harmed by being stillborn, then it may also be harmed 
by being aborted. If a measure like the DALY attempts to capture all health-related harms to 
members of a population, then a death late in pregnancy will be associated with a substantial 
number of DALYs, even if the death was a permissible killing.
However, when measures of health are constructed as a tool to aid in priority setting, they 
should not include data that will not be of use to priority setters. Different decision-makers 
may find different information valuable. If it is agreed that voluntary abortions are not an 
outcome that priority setters should seek to prevent, then they can be excluded from the 
calculation of DALYs and other similar statistics. The measure would then capture only the 
deaths of fetuses that the mother intended to bring to term, since those would be the fetal 
deaths that policy-makers would be concerned to prevent. This is not a denial of the harm 
done to a fetus by abortion. It is merely a recognition that not all harms are relevant to health 
priority setting. Including stillbirths in summary measures of health does not require 
adopting any particular stance towards abortion.
Finally, it is worth noting that a measure of health that includes stillbirths has the potential to 
benefit women and support the fulfillment of their rights. Interventions to prevent stillbirth 
often involve improving the health of the mother. Therefore, independently valuing 
stillbirths in priority setting is likely to lead to an increased emphasis on interventions that 
promote the health of women, in general, and of pregnant women, in particular.24 Moreover, 
even women who might in some instances consider terminating their pregnancies have an 
Phillips and Millum Page 7













interest in having the option of carrying pregnancies to term. A stillbirth is risky for the 
mother and denies her the opportunity to make her own choice about whether to have a 
child.25
3.4. Fourth Objection: Birth is ethically significant
The argument presented in Section 2 in favor of counting stillbirths suggests that the 
similarities between a fetus shortly before birth, and an infant shortly after, justify similar 
treatment of the death of each. There is, of course, at least one difference: one has been born, 
while the other has not. If the event of birth were itself ethically relevant, then including 
only deaths after birth in DALY calculations would not be arbitrary. Alternatively, even if 
birth itself were not ethically relevant, other attributes that are relevant to how bad it is to die 
might tend to occur very close to the time of birth. In that case, using birth as a cutoff for 
inclusion in summary measures of health might be a useful heuristic that would present a 
roughly accurate picture of the impact of disease. However, we will argue that the existing 
literature on the moral consideration that is due to fetuses and infants does not support 
treating birth as relevant in this way, and so instead supports counting stillbirths. Much of 
the literature suggests that those features relevant to the badness of death typically develop 
either before or after, not simultaneously with, birth. Those arguments that do treat birth 
itself as ethically significant support at most giving increased priority to infants over unborn 
fetuses; none support discounting fetal deaths entirely, as the current method of calculating 
DALYs suggests.
Philosophers thinking about abortion and the treatment of non-human animals have 
developed various accounts of the attributes in virtue of which a creature deserves moral 
consideration. Most fall into one of two main groups. The first group focuses on capacities 
that the creature has at present. For example, philosophers in this group have argued that 
moral consideration depends on sentience (the ability to feel)26 or on awareness of oneself 
as a subject of experience (such that one can desire one’s own continued existence).27 
Another group argues that having such capacities currently is not required for moral 
consideration; instead, one need only have the potential to develop them or be a member of a 
species that typically develops them.28 That is, a human fetus that is not currently sentient 
might be viewed as deserving of moral consideration because humans typically develop 
sentience.
This latter group of ‘potentiality’ arguments, generally employed to argue for the 
impermissibility of killing fetuses, need not concern us here. If such a view is correct, when 
applied to the moral significance of death, then fetuses deserve consideration in virtue of the 
fact that they have the potential to develop into human persons with whatever attributes 
make harm to infants a matter of moral concern.29 In that case the argument in favor of 
including stillbirths in measures of population health would be straightforward.
If the moral consideration that a fetus should be given instead depends on its current 
capacities, then it is important to ascertain when those capacities first emerge. Current 
research suggests that capacities often taken to be relevant to moral consideration 
consistently develop before or after birth rather than concurrently. For instance, the data 
suggest that sentience begins sometime between 20 and 30 weeks of gestational age,30 while 
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even the most primitive self-awareness generally does not appear until at least two months 
after birth.31
More generally, it is implausible that a capacity determining whether a human is deserving 
of moral consideration would consistently appear at the time of birth. Since live births can 
occur after pregnancies of varying lengths, any capacity whose development was tied to the 
gestational age at which birth most commonly occurs, rather than to the event of birth itself, 
would be present in some unborn fetuses and absent in some infants. On the other hand, any 
capacity that develops as a result of experiences undergone following birth, such as 
exposure to a wider range of sensory stimulation than is possible during pregnancy, will not 
be present immediately after birth when many infant deaths occur. For this reason, a number 
of philosophers have endorsed the claim that birth itself does not alter the extent to which 
one is deserving of moral consideration. As L. W. Sumner says: birth is “a shallow and 
arbitrary criterion of moral standing, and there appears to be no way of connecting it to a 
deeper account.”32
Some attempts have been made to argue explicitly, contrary to Sumner’s position and ours, 
that birth itself is morally relevant. Mary Anne Warren argues that although the intrinsic 
properties of a late-term fetus are the same as those of a newborn infant, we should not treat 
them identically because the event of birth changes the relations between the infant and 
other members of the community.33 However, this argument does not, and is not meant to, 
show either that fetuses cannot be harmed or that harms to them are not worthy of moral 
consideration. Instead, Warren’s argument is meant to show that it may be acceptable to put 
in place additional legal prohibitions against killing infants that do not apply to fetuses. As 
we argued in Section 3.3, the ethics of permissible killing are distinct from questions of 
harm and moral consideration: there may be reasons why it is worse to kill an infant than a 
fetus, that do not imply that it is worse for the infant than the fetus to die from disease. 
Moreover, Warren explicitly acknowledges that “of course” sentient fetuses are morally 
relevant and “need to be protected from a variety of possible harms.”34 Her argument might 
suggest that infants deserve additional consideration, but since many of the morally 
important characteristics she identifies are shared by infants and fetuses, this would only 
imply that infant deaths be given greater weight, not that stillbirths do not matter at all.
José Bermúdez argues that infants, but not late-term fetuses, have a primitive form of self-
consciousness; while this primitive self-consciousness would not in itself justify moral 
consideration, it does so based on its relation to more fully developed self-consciousness.35 
Thus he holds that birth is ethically significant. However, Shaun Gallagher has convincingly 
argued that, granting Bermúdez’s interpretation of what counts as a primitive form of self-
consciousness, we should ascribe such a capacity to some fetuses as well as to infants.36 
Regardless, Bermúdez’s argument is subject to objections typically employed against 
potentiality arguments— it is not clear why the primitive form of a morally relevant capacity 
should itself be morally relevant. Finally, Bermúdez himself concedes that primitive self-
consciousness is only one among several grounds for moral consideration, and that fetuses 
are worthy of some consideration. Thus his position, like Warren’s, at most supports an 
increase in consideration following birth, not a total lack of consideration for fetuses.
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Finally, one might argue that, while morally relevant capacities do not generally appear 
precisely at the moment of birth, they ordinarily develop close enough to that time that it is 
appropriate to calculate summary measures of health as if birth were significant. David 
DeGrazia makes a similar argument in a different context, claiming that a number of aspects 
of an infant’s mental life undergo substantial development shortly after birth that justify 
treating infants differently from fetuses for some purposes.37 Alternatively, it might be 
thought that uncertainty about exactly when the deaths of fetuses or newborns start to matter 
justify taking birth as an approximation.38 However, argument s like these should not be 
extended to the case of constructing summary measures of health. We have argued that there 
are good reasons to believe that late stillbirths and early newborn deaths are similarly 
relevant to priority setting, and these arguments do not give any new reason to discount that 
belief. However, this similarity would be ignored by an approach that treats important 
developments after birth as if they occur at the moment of birth. Instead, such an approach 
will treat preventing infant deaths— even those occurring almost immediately after birth— 
as much more important than preventing stillbirths. It will therefore give inappropriate 
weight to interventions that assist newborns over those that prevent stillbirths. Since the 
diseases that cause stillbirths are frequently different than those that kill infants, as are the 
interventions to prevent or treat them, such an approximation fails to capture important 
information about the harm of deaths occurring near the time of birth and is not appropriate 
for use in priority setting.
In summary, leading views in the philosophical literature suggest that the qualities that 
render one deserving of moral consideration typically develop either before or after birth. 
Even if an argument like Warren’s or Bermúdez’s succeeds, it will show only that birth 
increases the extent to which one is deserving of such consideration, not that fetuses do not 
merit consideration. Furthermore, birth is not even a good way of approximating important 
developments for the purpose of priority setting, so an approach like DeGrazia’s is not 
appropriate here. Assuming that we are committed to considering harms to infants in a 
summary measure of health, anyone wishing to argue that no fetus should be given any 
consideration bears the burden of devising a novel argument to show that birth is a necessary 
condition for moral consideration. Absent such an argument, stillbirths should be included in 
summary measures of health.
4. Complications in including stillbirths in estimates of disease burden
Determining the DALY values of fetal deaths at particular stages of pregnancy involves both 
conceptual and empirical challenges. We have argued that including stillbirths in summary 
measures of health is consistent with excluding miscarriages, or with weighing them less 
heavily, and that the characteristics that make fetuses worthy of moral consideration may 
continue to develop after birth. This leaves open many different ways of weighting deaths at 
different stages of pregnancy and infancy. Choosing between them will involve identifying 
characteristics of a person or a fetus that should affect the weight afforded to its death, and 
then empirically determining the extent to which embryos and fetuses at different stages 
typically possess these characteristics. Furthermore, the same factors that place a fetus at 
risk of death may also systematically impede development of the very characteristics that 
make that death morally significant. For instance, malnutrition, a leading risk factor for 
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stillbirth, can also impede brain development and might therefore delay the onset of 
sentience or self-awareness.39 Failing to account for such differences could potentially 
exaggerate the number of DALYs attributable to stillbirths.
Even once the weightings of individual health outcomes have been determined, assessing the 
impact of considering stillbirths on the total number of DALYs prevented by an intervention 
will not be straightforward. Preventing a stillbirth does not guarantee that the resulting child 
will live a full and healthy life. Instead, it might die in infancy or suffer disability. For 
example, antenatal screening by ultrasound may, by detecting signs of placental 
insufficiency, reduce the risk of stillbirth. However, even when a stillbirth is prevented in 
such a case, the child is likely to suffer lasting negative health effects, potentially resulting 
in a number of DALYs.40 Such infants may also face higher mortality rates in low- and 
middle-income country settings where neonatal intensive care facilities are scarce. Thus 
some interventions that achieve apparently positive health impacts by preventing stillbirths 
are very likely to be offset, in part, by negative effects associated with the factors that placed 
the fetus at risk for stillbirth. If infant deaths, or adult disabilities, are weighted substantially 
more heavily than stillbirths in calculating DALYs, the intervention could even increase the 
burden of disease, despite allowing some children, who otherwise would have been stillborn, 
to survive.
5. A conservative proposal for incorporating stillbirths into summary 
measures of health
How ought we to proceed, given both a compelling argument in favor of including stillbirths 
in summary measures of health, and significant unresolved questions about how they should 
ideally be incorporated? Such questions are not a reason to exclude stillbirths entirely, even 
for the time being. Health spending decisions must be made, even when some uncertainty is 
present. Our goal here is to describe an approach that allows for the inclusion of stillbirths in 
summary measures of health, avoids placing excessive value on the prevention of deaths 
early in pregnancy, and represents an improvement over current practice from the 
perspective of policymakers regardless of their positions on the permissibility of abortion. 
An approach that meets those criteria should be widely endorsed as an improvement over 
current practice.
First, we propose that fetal deaths be included in measures of health when they occur after 
the onset of sentience, which is best judged by when the fetus gains the capacity to 
experience pain. Prior to sentience, there may be good reasons not to kill a fetus, but it is 
hard to see how the fetus itself could be harmed by its death; instead, the death of the fetus 
would have disvalue insofar as it lead to harms to other family members, particularly the 
pregnant woman. On the other hand, while capacities other than sentience may also be 
relevant to moral consideration, if sentience did not justify some degree of moral 
consideration it would be difficult to explain the importance of avoiding harms to newborn 
infants.41 Many—perhaps most—philosophers who have considered this question agree that 
the possession of some form of sentience is sufficient for an individual to be capable of 
being harmed in a way that matters morally.42
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While the exact time at which sentience begins is a subject of ongoing debate, the expert 
consensus is that there is a reasonable possibility that fetuses can feel pain by 28 weeks 
gestational age.43 Until the onset of sentience can be more firmly established, it is 
reasonable to begin counting stillbirths that occur at any time after 28 weeks, in order to 
ensure that the deaths of sentient beings do not go uncounted. By not counting fetal deaths 
prior to 28 weeks, this approach avoids placing a counter-intuitive degree of priority on the 
prevention of miscarriages.
Second, we propose that the disvalue attached to a fetal death should gradually increase 
from zero, at 28 weeks gestational age, to a value equaling that of the death of a newborn 
infant, at the time of birth. This factor should increase more rapidly close to the time of 
birth, such that late stillbirths are weighed much more heavily than early stillbirths, to reflect 
the greater confidence that we can have in the moral consideration due to fetuses that are 
highly similar to infants. Our proposal implies that the loss of future life is more important 
for a fully developed infant than for a barely-sentient fetus. Such an approach avoids 
discontinuity at birth and reflects the intuition that stillbirths involving highly developed 
fetuses close to birth are worse health outcomes than earlier stillbirths and miscarriages.44
As the literature we discussed in Section 3.4 suggests, how bad it is for a fetus to die may 
depend on more than just whether she is sentient. It may also depend on the development of 
other important capacities, such as self-awareness or psychological continuity. This would 
imply that the development of morally important capacities continues after birth, too. Thus, 
a decreased weighting for neonatal deaths, relative to the deaths of older children, would be 
consistent with the approach employed here.45 Figure 1 illustrates this possibility. The first 
graph displays our proposal for incorporating stillbirths into DALYs using the current 
method for valuing deaths after birth. The second displays our proposal within a framework 
in which how bad it is to die gradually increases from the onset of sentience through to a 
point in early childhood when all the morally relevant capacities have developed. The 
proposal is consistent with both approaches.
Third, on the conservative approach we propose, summary measures of health intended for 
use in priority setting should not include losses to the fetus as a result of voluntary 
termination of pregnancy. The harm of death for an aborted fetus is similar to that resulting 
from a stillbirth at a similar gestational age; therefore, preventing some abortions may result 
in health gains. It does not follow that the same priority should be given to preventing the 
termination of an unwanted pregnancy as to preventing the stillbirth of one that a woman 
intends to bring to term. The ethical status of late voluntary abortions remains a contentious 
issue; some policy-makers may wish to prioritize the prevention of such abortions, while 
others will not. The proposal presented here, which associates DALYs with stillbirths but 
not voluntary abortions, should represent an improvement over current practice from the 
perspectives of both groups. It is also worth noting that, since our proposal counts only those 
stillbirths occurring after the onset of sentience, the overwhelming majority of voluntary 
abortions would in any case be irrelevant to the measure.46
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The similarities between a stillbirth occurring shortly before birth and the death of an infant 
shortly after birth justify treating them similarly for purposes of a summary measure of 
health. The arguments against including stillbirths fail to demonstrate an ethically significant 
intrinsic difference between the fetus and the infant, or an important societal reason for 
excluding harms occurring before birth.
Outstanding questions, both conceptual and empirical, must be answered to determine 
exactly how stillbirths should ideally be counted in summary measures of health. Similar 
difficulties are present with other features of such measures. For instance, DALYs attempt to 
quantify how much worse it is to be blind than to suffer from lower back pain. Certainly 
there are bound to be errors and imprecisions in the methodologies used to compare these 
conditions, but that is not a reason either to treat the two as equally bad or to exclude one 
entirely from DALY calculations. Similarly, uncertainty about the proper weighting to give 
to stillbirths as compared to infant deaths should not prevent us from recognizing, and taking 
into account in priority setting, the fact that a late and unwanted stillbirth is a poor health 
outcome and one that we have some reason to try to prevent. If stillbirths are ethically 
significant, and therefore relevant to priority setting, even an imperfect manner of including 
them is likely to make summary measures of health more accurate.
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